Right-wing nationalist parties are on the rise. We investigate why chauvinistic slogans and hatemongering catch on in France, Poland and Hungary…
France:
By JVG
The significance of the Front National is reflected in the biographies of Jean-Marie Le Pen and his daughter Marine. The elder Le Pen, who was born in 1928, openly professed his far-right extremism and racism. He also candidly admitted his anti-Semitism, calling the gas chambers of the Nazis a “detail of history”, a statement for which Le Pen was tried and convicted – which changed his behavior not one whit. As a dyed-in-the-wool racist, Jean-Marie Le Pen slandered Muslims and Arabs. Such incitements brought the senior Le Pen modest political success. In 1984, he was elected a member of the European Parliament; in 2002, Le Pen succeeded in forcing Jacques Chirac into a second round of elections for the presidency where, however, Le Pen was roundly defeated.
Marine Le Pen is more “modern” than her father. She rejects open anti-Semitism and claims she is opposed to racism “on principle”. Instead Marine Le Pen presents herself as a populist. She is opposed to immigration, particularly immigration of Muslims and people from third-world countries. And she rails against European integration and the euro. But her image is not one of a “grubby” far-right extremist but rather of a mainstream politician who is at the very least tolerated by polite society. For this “moderate” image, Marine Le Pen is prepared to sacrifice everything, even the party membership of her blustering father, who with age is increasingly descending into obstinate irrelevance. Marine Le Pen by contrast is gaining in stature, even as the traditional middle-class French parties are losing favor.
The conservative Nicolas Sarkozy and socialist François Hollande are both extremely unpopular. Sarkozy aroused distaste in large part for his proximity to the affluent; Hollande has been castigated for his economic failures. Hollande’s approval ratings are a disaster, at times hovering around five percent. Even though more than 70 percent of French voters say they want neither Hollande nor Sarkozy, both are currently planning to compete in the next presidential election. In so doing, they are forcing voters to choose between the deeply unpopular political establishment and the Front National. As the December 2015 regional elections demonstrated, the Front National is currently the most powerful force in French politics. This is in part because the French state has failed to meet the desire for security among rural and suburban voters in particular. France has also been unable to integrate young people of Maghreb descent and to effectively counter the resulting rise of Islamist extremism. For many in France, the terror attacks of the past two years are evidence of a larger failure of the state, which has caused even some French Jews to gravitate toward the Front National. But this would be a mistake.
No, Marine Le Pen is no open anti-Semite. But her de facto racism is no real improvement. Nor is her policy of European disintegration. Marine Le Pen models herself on the likes of Putin, Orbán and Erdogan. Their authoritarian worldview,
which is driving their countries into isolation, is contrary to the French spirit that all enlightened nations still cherish: the spirit of liberté, egalité, fraternité.
Poland:
By Robert Kahn
The 70th anniversary of the post-Shoah pogrom of Kielce, where locals murdered 42 Jews on July 4, 1946, has not only spurred a complicity debate but also sparked national identity tangles. The discussion focuses on a blame game and is just one expression of the deep divisions of Polish society today. Poland’s lurch to the right began years ago when a major sector of its population didn’t come to terms with the rapid transition from the old communist era to one of the greatest success stories of the European Union. The rightwing nationalist PiS (Law and Justice) party owed its sweeping election victory in October 2015 above all to the many Poles who have not benefited from the country’s strong economic growth. Since PiS party leader Jaroslaw Kaczynsky has returned to office, he has been striving to accumulate power by stigmatizing and removing political opponents, putting pressure on media outlets and escalating eurosceptic rhetoric. His vow to roll back previous legislation culminated in the announcement that “the current Constitutional Tribunal is a redoubt of everything that is wrong in Poland.” With this primacy of political will over law, many legal mechanisms are now in a state of paralysis.
The PiS party, which is also holding the country’s presidency, is systematically undermining the system of checks and balances. Kaczynsky has actually praised Viktor Orbán’s leadership, or “illiberal democracy”. In the recent months, hundreds of thousands of Poles have taken to the streets to protest the changes. However, the opposition lacks vision and a positive agenda, while the silent majority appears to be tired of gender issues dominating politics, fears the loss of sovereignty to the European Union, and moves closer together in the face of outside interferences and criticism. If the attempts of Poland’s populist government to debilitate the country’s democratic institutions are successful, this will encourage groups with more radical policies to crack down on everything that stands for an open society. A bitter foretaste of such a regression was provided by some incidents in the western Polish city of Wroclaw: In November, dozens of demonstrators participated in the burning of the effigy of an orthodox Jew, the “eternal other,” to protest Muslim immigration. In early May, during an anti-EU protest march, Ultranationalists burned the poster of the Mayor of Wroclaw, Rafal Dutkiewicz, who was shown wearing a kippah. Dutkiewicz is a staunch supporter of Poland’s liberal political camp which is now under threat.
Hungary:
By Hartmut Bomhoff
When the Left doesn’t respond to people, they turn to the Right,” admits an opposition representative with a shrug. Six years after Viktor Orbán won his first supermajority, right-wing nationalist parties are still enjoying massive support in Hungary. One recent Median poll showed that the percentage of eligible and decided voters supporting the governing Fidesz party fell from 53 percent in January to 46 percent in February. Another Median survey discovered that a third of all Hungarians hold anti-Semitic views, and there are plenty of Hungarians who are happy to defend their government’s tough policies on refugees and migrants.
When Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány, an advocate of a full-fledged free-market democracy, resigned from office in 2009, his socialist-liberal coalition faced a pile of shards. Its incompetence in matters of administration, as well as accusations of lies and corruption scandals, made many of their followers look for a strong leader personality. Viktor Orbán has made increasing the state’s role in the economy the cornerstone of his rule; he calls this a shift as profound as the one from communism to democracy. Budapest looks good and prosperous today, with its new metro line, new pedestrian zones and lavish development projects, but more and more locals question this happy narrative. The ruling Fidesz party has come under fire for using its constitutional majority to push through legislation and constitutional changes that solidified the party’s control over the country – rewriting the election laws, Fidesz managed to win a 2/3 majority in 2014, despite obtaining less than 50 percent of the popular vote –, and Orbán has to face allegations of crony capitalism. With an average income level of allegedly 800 euros per month (500 euros might be more realistic) and high taxes, long run wages and living standards which haven’t improved over the years, poverty is more visible than ever. And yet people cry “And the Gyurcsány-crew? They were the real thieves!”
Policy isn’t necessarily decided through open debate, but rather by political connections and loyalty, or by the wealth of the new elite. One of the startling aspects of these policies is the Hungarian right’s belief in a close relationship between church and state. Some weeks ago, the Prime Minister pointed out that “that the heritage of the Hungarian Reformed Church, which is so important for the Hungarian nation, may be a continuing source of strength.” Orbáns Minister of Human Capacities, Zoltán Balog, is a minister of the Reformed Church, and so is the openly anti-Semitic Lorant Hegedűs, who has close connections to the far-right Jobbik party. Viktor Orbán has to compete with Jobbik for the nationalist votes and finances his anti-EU propaganda with public funds, distracting his followers from the dismal state Hungary is currently in. The opposition parties, however, appear much too weak to join forces in order to beat Fidesz.